According to conventional wisdom, diplomacy begins at the end of domestic politics, which implies that domestic politics influence diplomacy. However, constructivists in international relations believe that domestic and foreign politics are constitutive of each other. In other words, it is not just that domestic politics drives a country’s diplomacy but diplomacy that impacts domestic politics.
This view resonates with how Vietnamese leaders look at the role of diplomacy. Late general-secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), Nguyen Phu Trong, once told the country’s diplomats that “diplomacy is now not just continuation of the domestic policy, but also a strong driver that stands behind the successful implementation of strategic goals of building and defending the socialist homeland of Vietnam.”
The theory of a third wave of democratization, which began in the late 1970s and lasted to “the end of history” in 1989, suggests that pressure from the outside led to the collapse of communism and transformation of world politics. However, since launching Vietnam’s Đổi Mới (renewal) program, which focused on economic liberalization to attract foreign investment, the CPV has strategically employed diplomacy to legitimize its rule and monopoly of power. Successive joint statements between Vietnam and the United States since 2013, for example, have emphasized the latter’s respect for the former’s political system, implying the recognition of the CPV’s rule and legitimacy.
The CPV’s “Bamboo Diplomacy” doctrine successfully maneuvered the nation out of the embargo and blockade executed by China and most Western nations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. After 40 years of opening, Vietnam has established diplomatic relations with 194 countries, of which 38 are comprehensive strategic (CSP), strategic (SP) and comprehensive (CP) partners. Four out of five permanent members of the UN Security Council are Vietnam’s CSPs: China, France, Russia, and the United States. Last year, Vietnam’s economy became the thirty-fourth largest economy in the world. It is forecast that Vietnam will become the second largest economy in Southeast Asia and the twentieth largest economy in the world in the next decade.
Deepening international integration has pushed the country to undertake legal reforms to adhere to the rules of the capitalist game. Political reforms are free from external pressures and thus far have been kept under the CPV’s control. However, the CPV’s strategy is to elevate the nation’s diplomatic stature in the international arena, which will require political reforms. Such reforms will likely involve a rethinking of internal power allocation within the CPV’s politburo and among the top four leadership positions, namely the “four pillars” of party general-secretary, the state president, the prime minister and the president of the national assembly.
According to Vietnam’s Constitution, the president is the head of state representing the country in all international relations. He is also the commander-in-chief of all armed forces and chairperson of the national defence and security council. However, the Constitution also identifies the CPV as the only ruling party, responsible for the leadership in the country and society. The party chief hence is de facto the top official in both domestic politics and international affairs. This power-allocating culture based on the four-pillar model has generated some ambiguities with partners in terms of diplomatic protocols. It has also triggered questions and debates about the actual authority of the two top pillars—the CPV general-secretary and the state president—in this era of international integration.
In the mid-1990s, for instance, both the CPV general-secretary and the state president were present in welcoming and holding talks with Chinese Communist Party general-secretaries (and also Chinese president) Jiang Zemin (1994) and Hu Jintao (2006). More recently, Xi Jinping was welcomed at the airport by President Luong Cuong while the official ceremony was hosted by general secretary To Lam. The same protocols were offered to Fidel Castro in 1995 who visited Vietnam in his triple role as the First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party and Chairperson of the State Council and the Council of Ministers.
In 2015, Nguyen Phu Trong became the first CPV general-secretary, without the presidency role, holding talks with President Barack Obama at the White House. Trong’s visit was hailed as historic but initially caused debates on the U.S. side about Trong’s official title on the visit and the diplomatic protocols rendered to him. Trong, in fact, created the precedent of top leader-level diplomacy in the case of Vietnam. Trong in various cases bypassed his president to hold telephone talks with heads of state and government of Sri Lanka (2021), Republic of Korea (2021), Germany (2022), India (2022), Mozambique (2022), Japan (2023), France (2023), and Russia (2024). Trong also invited Joe Biden to become the first U.S. president to pay a state visit to Vietnam in September 2023.
Trong’s top leader-level diplomacy has been carried forward by To Lam, who was elected president in May 2024 and the CPV chief in August 2024 after Trong’s sudden death in July. Since October 2024, after ceding the presidency, To Lam has made seven official and state visits to Malaysia (2024), Indonesia (2025), Singapore (2025), Russia (2025), Belarus (2025), Kazakhstan (2025), Azerbaijan (2025), and two calls with US president Donald Trump (in 2024 and 2025). Notably, Vietnam upgraded relations with six of these countries to CSP and SP during To Lam’s visit. Through these visits, Lam projected the image of the actual authoritative head of state.
To Lam has been widely considered as sitting behind the wheel of the on-going revolution of political reforms in the government and party apparatus across the country and at all levels. The current session of the National Assembly is expected to pass amendments to the Constitution to legitimize these political reforms. This would be the largest and most impactful reforms since Đổi Mới.
The concept of political reforms is rarely used in Vietnam and very often avoided to bypass any misunderstanding of political regime transformation. Instead, but by the same nature, institutional reform is a nuanced concept that is more acceptable. Since September 2024, the CPV headed by To Lam has conducted a sweeping institutional reform program, which aims at streamlining and reorganizing three segments of the overall political system and governing structure. The first segment is the party and state apparatus, which includes party commissions, government agencies, and functional committees of the National Assembly. After the completion of reforms in this space, the government now has only 17, reduced from 22, ministries and ministerial-level agencies; CPV commissions have been reduced from eight to five; and the National Assembly’s functional committees have also been reduced from 14 to nine.
The second segment is the local government system. According to the central government’s proposal, which was approved by the CPV Central Committee and the National Assembly, local government will be established at two levels, namely the provincial and the commune level. Once the current draft amendments to the constitution are adopted, Vietnam will have only 34 provinces or equivalents, reduced from 63, and around 2,000 communes or equivalents, reduced from more than 10,000. There will be no more middle-level authorities between the provincial and commune levels.
The third segment is the system of the Vietnam Motherland Front, a voluntary political alliance representing all Vietnamese citizens under the CPV’s control as well as mass organizations and their members. Reforms of this system will follow after reforms of the first two segments have been completed.
A draft resolution on proposed amendments to the constitution to legitimize reforms in the second and third segments is being published for public feedback. Although it is not necessary to make any constitutional amendment to empower the CPV general-secretary to serve concurrently in the presidency role, To Lam’s remarks at a recent meeting with the Central Commission for Organizational Affairs suggest that power-relocation at the top level is likely to happen soon.
It is not yet known whether and when the CPV’s reforms will take one more step further toward an extended political project in which the general-secretary will simultaneously serve as head of state. However, the mutually constitutive relationship between Vietnam’s diplomacy and its domestic politics—as seen through the lens of To Lam’s top leader-level diplomacy—makes it the right time for the CPV to complete this project.