Benny Gantz’s six-month government proposal to return all of the hostages and pass a haredi draft law is just what Israel needs, but it doesn’t address the major roadblocks.
On Saturday night, Blue and White party head Benny Gantz stood before the cameras and offered Israel a simple deal: build a short, focused “hostage-redemption and service-supporting” government for six months, set an agreed election date for the spring of 2026, and spend the interim period on two tasks only.
First, bring every hostage home. Second, pass a universal conscription framework that treats service as a national obligation, with real paths for military or civilian service and fewer loopholes.
In plain English, Gantz wants a unity cabinet with an expiration date and a narrow mission. He insists he will not join alone, calling on Opposition Leader Yair Lapid and Yisrael Beytenu chief Avigdor Lieberman to come with him, and repeats that his aim is not to “save Netanyahu,” but to save the hostages.
Pidyon shvuyim is a deep Jewish imperative, the redemption of captives. It is why hostage families have set the nation’s moral compass since October 7, 2023. Today, the official Israeli count says terror groups in Gaza hold about 50 hostages, at least 28 of them confirmed dead. Around 20 are believed to be alive, with grave concern for two others.
The government says it will resume negotiations, “on our terms,” after Hamas indicated openness to a new mediated proposal. That proposal’s contours have shifted, but the principle is clear: any serious deal requires choices that could crack the current coalition.
Haredi protesters against the IDF draft block Highway 4 near Bnei Brak, August 19, 2025. (credit: Shimon Baruch/TPS)
Now, the second pillar, the draft. Israel’s Supreme Court ruled in 2024 that, absent a new law, the state must draft ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students and stop funding institutions whose students evade service. That decision put a decades-old political compromise on a legal clock.
Since then, the government has sought a new bill. Every version is a fuse. Tighten enlistment and Haredi parties threaten to bolt. Soften it and the court, the army, and the broader public revolt.
Gantz is trying to cut through both knots with one rope: a narrow, time-bound government that exists only to pass a hostage deal and a service framework, then sends the country to the polls. He also says, pointedly, that a deal is attainable. And there is political oxygen for that claim. Lapid has offered a parliamentary “safety net” of 24 votes for any hostage agreement, no quid pro quo, just bring them home. If the far-right leaves the coalition, the votes would still be there to pass the deal in theory.
In practice, here is why it probably will not happen.
Reasons why Gantz’s proposal will probably fall through the cracks
First, the prime minister’s incentives. Benjamin Netanyahu has signaled he will negotiate, but “on Israel’s terms,” while planning expanded military operations. He governs by balancing partners to his right who oppose concessions in a hostage deal and partners to his ultra-Orthodox flank who demand a softer draft law. A six-month unity cabinet that passes both would solve Israel’s problems and create his. It would collapse the very leverage that keeps this coalition intact.
Netanyahu can also argue he does not need Gantz if Lapid’s safety net exists, which lets him pocket the leverage of the offer without paying the political price of a real unity reset.
Second, the coalition math. The draft law is an existential issue for Haredi parties. The court ruling is final, and public patience is thin. Any meaningful draft bill risks blowing up the coalition. Any cosmetic bill risks being thrown out in court. That is why this keeps returning as a crisis, week after week.
A temporary unity cabinet would absorb the blast so the country can move forward, which is precisely why existing partners will try to defuse it before it is lit.
Third, Gantz’s leverage is weaker than it was. Polls in recent days have his Blue and White party hovering near, or even dipping below, the electoral threshold. Rival opposition leaders worry he could waste center-left votes, as happened to Meretz in 2022, and they have little appetite to lend him political oxygen.
That makes it harder to assemble a credible unity line-up that can walk in together and walk out together six months later.
Fourth, the trust deficit. Israelis remember the 2020 “rotation” unity deal that collapsed in acrimony. Gantz still carries the scars of sitting with Netanyahu. Netanyahu still believes he can outlast rivals rather than empower them. Trust is not a policy, but in Israel, it is a governing tool, and there is not much of it left.
Still, let us say clearly what should be obvious. A six-month government with two jobs is exactly what Israel needs. The hostages come first. That is not a slogan. It is a policy choice. If twenty Israelis are still alive in Gaza, every day matters. A government that treats “bring them home” as its sole North Star is more likely to take the necessary political risks, use Lapid’s safety net, and bear the price.
The same is true for service. Most Israelis already carry the military and reserve burden. A fair service framework, with real civilian service tracks and real enforcement, would strengthen social cohesion and the IDF alike. The court has already forced the issue into the present tense.
Israel’s next regular election is currently scheduled for October 27, 2026. Gantz is proposing to move that up modestly, to spring 2026, after a short sprint to pass the two most urgent decisions facing the country. It is not radical. It is responsible.
So where does that leave us? With the right idea and a poor prognosis. Netanyahu’s survival instincts, the coalition’s red lines, Gantz’s polling slide, and the bitter lessons of the past make this plan unlikely to leave the podium and enter the plenum. I hope I am wrong. If Gantz, Lapid, Lieberman, and Netanyahu can surprise the nation and form a half-year government that returns the living and buries a broken draft system, I will be the first to write that I misread the moment.
Until then, expect more talk about “terms” and “timing,” more ultimatums from the extremes, and more hesitation. The hostages do not have that time. They need a government that behaves like a rescue team, not a focus group.