This study aimed to explore the global expansion and financial dynamics of the corporate FFR sector, with a particular focus on the financial performance of the leading publicly listed corporations. We observed several key trends. Firstly, FFR sales in HICs are stagnating, likely associated with saturated mature markets [65], whereas sales in lower- and upper-middle income countries demonstrated moderate to high levels of growth. The patterns observed align with analyses of sales growth in other segments of the food industry [6, 58]. Second, we found that the global FFR market is largely dominated by U.S.-based firms, with several key players consistently vying for the top positions in most markets, irrespective of region or country income level. Third, we identified that despite declining sales growth in HICs and overall revenue fluctuations throughout the years, these dominant firms have maintained relatively high net profit margins.
While part of this may be due to their expanding presence in LMICs, Fig. 3a shows that overall revenue for the leading firms remained variable. However, our analysis also demonstrated that net profit margins and shareholder payout ratios were comparatively stable, indicating that profitability was less affected by revenue fluctuations. Examining the financial trends of the global FFR industry highlighted how these firms have continued to extract substantial profits under such conditions. These patterns reflect core dynamics of the corporate food regime, in which transnational firms consolidate power, expand into new markets, and maintain profitability.
Global FFR growth: Regional expansion patterns under different political economies
Regional patterns of FFR growth revealed the most rapid expansion in the Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and the Middle East, with US-based FFRs dominating market shares in key countries of growth such as China, India, South Korea, Mexico, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The expansion of fast-food markets in the Asia-Pacific region in particular reflects key dynamics of the nutrition transition and imbuing of corporate food systems in these parts of the world. For example, China’s FFR sales grew by 54.2% (CAGR 3.1%) between 2009 and 2023, far outpacing other markets in the region (with the exception of India). KFC, in particular, has capitalised on China’s increasing preference for chicken over other meats and is now deeply embedded in China’s urban food culture as the most dominant fast-food chain [58] (Supplementary Figure S1). KFC was one of the first FFRs to enter the Chinese market, establishing a joint-venture in 1987 with 60% ownership held by KFC, 27% by the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Culture and 13% by Beijing Food Production [66]. It was also one of the first FFRs to develop a localisation strategy in the region, tailoring their menu offerings to Chinese cultural preferences [67]. Fried chicken, in particular, is more closely aligned with traditional Chinese culinary practices than hamburgers, which may partially explain how KFC has been able to outperform McDonald’s [68]. A recent survey found that Chinese consumers are more likely to dine at KFC restaurants and spend more time there than American consumers [69].
In the Middle East and Latin America, increasing FFR market growth was observed to be strongest in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Mexico. These countries share several features that likely facilitated fast-food expansion. First, all have undergone nutrition transitions, marked by rising consumption of ultra-processed and convenience foods, alongside increasing incomes and rates of urbanisation [6]. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, rising interest for convenient, Western-branded food has aligned with economic diversification strategies – such as Saudi Vision 2030 – which has played an active role in attracting foreign investment in retail and food service [70]. Both countries have also supported franchising and private-sector growth through land use policies and relaxed foreign ownership rules in a range of sectors, including food service [71, 72]. In contrast, many scholars have speculated the North American Free Trade Agreement playing a key role in integrating Mexico into US food and investment markets, including through US agribusiness investment [73,74,75]. This penetration has increasingly shaped urban foodscapes by embedding the presence of transnational FFR and UPF firms in cities that have traditionally been serviced by small-scale vendors [76], a substantial cut to national and urban food sovereignty.
FFR growth was observed to be strongest in China, India, and South Korea, contrasting with countries like Japan, which saw more limited growth between 2009 and 2023. A range of factors may explain this. From a policy perspective, China has allowed foreign corporate activity but under relatively strict conditions that maintain state oversight [77, 78]. For example, McDonald’s has functioned in China through joint ventures with firms CITIC Group (a Chinese state-owned enterprise) and Carlyle (a US private equity firm), with CITIC maintaining a controlling 52% stake until 2023 [79]. In contrast, while Japan has similarly introduced foreign FFRs into their food systems, it has maintained stronger protections for domestic food service industries, which has limited foreign FFR expansion relative to China [80]. For example, the Japanese government provides a range of subsidies and support to local small- and medium-sized enterprises [81]. This strategy may align with Japan’s desire to maintain its culinary culture and a cultivate a preference for local cuisine. In this light, while McDonald’s is the leading FFR brand in Japan, the country still maintains a competitive domestic FFR market, which may moderate the overall market share of transnational FFR firms [80]. These contrasts underscore how corporate food regimes can manifest in different ways under different political economies, and how different forms of state-market relations interact with the power of corporate FFRs.
How FFRs service shareholder primacy: from food service retailers to real estate moguls
Franchising has emerged as a key profit-maximising strategy through which corporate FFRs reduce operational costs and risks, enabling new forms of value extraction that align with the broader logics of financialisation and the consolidation of the corporate food regime. Many large FFRs have adopted a highly franchised business model, shifting the burden of direct operational expenses onto franchisees while maintaining centralised control over the brand. This arrangement allows franchisees to leverage the power of the brand to generate sales of the franchisor in exchange for royalty payments and a portion of their profits; although the benefits to franchisees are not always realised, as they often face significant financial pressures and operational constraints [82, 83]. For example, following Yum! China’s spin-off from Yum! Brands in 2016 (a move driven by broader strategic goals in the region as well as challenges in the Chinese market, including previous food safety scandals), 93% of Yum! Brands’ locations were franchised globally. This figure increased to 98% by 2018 as part of Yum! Brands’ broader strategy to reduce operational costs and risks, as well as revenue recovery from the spin-off [84]. The shift allowed the company to focus on generating revenue through franchise fees and rent, creating a more ‘asset-light’ business model [85]. This mirrors broader transformations within the corporate food regime, whereby firms increasingly profit not just from producing food, but also from controlling the infrastructures and land through which food is distributed, branded, and consumed. Such strategies see corporate FFRs transitioning away from being solely food service providers, with profits being increasingly derived from rent collection rather than direct food sales [86].
McDonald’s, with a global brand valuation of approximately $200 billion USD, sees average franchise investments in the US ranging between one to two million dollars [87]. When McDonald’s faced declining revenues in 2015, it reportedly financed its stock buy-back program by increasing its reliance on franchising (alongside other cuts in ‘general and administrative expenses’) [88]. These strategies exemplify how shareholder primacy is operationalised within the corporate food regime, as financial returns to investors are prioritised over reinvestment in productive or social functions. The focus on brand value aligns with related trends in “intellectual monopoly capitalism” [42], where companies rely on intellectual property like trademarks and brands to maintain high market values even if their sales revenue does not grow at the same rate [89, 90]. Such a trend has not been without negative consequences. Franchising places significant pressure on workers, especially in terms of wages and working conditions [91]. Research shows that in advanced capitalist economies (like the United States), the franchising model incentivises franchisees to minimise wages and extract greater productivity from employees [87], raising legal and ethical concerns about potential labour exploitation [86].
Our analysis reveals increased expansion of FFR markets in LMICs, which introduces additional complexities. Emerging FFR markets in LMICs are attractive to global franchisors, yet the regulatory frameworks that govern franchising in these contexts are often underdeveloped [92]. This lack of regulation can lead to unequal contracts between franchisors and franchisees, creating information gaps that result in unfair practices [92]. Smaller, local franchisees are especially at risk, as they may struggle to navigate or challenge these imbalances, particularly in places where legal protections are weak or biased in favour of large multinational companies [92, 93]. Such dynamics pose substantial challenges to food sovereignty, as small- and medium-sized local actors lose control to transnational firms, who consolidate their dominance through both financial and contractual mechanisms. In this context, franchising becomes not only a business strategy, but a mode of governance that reconfigures local food economies in ways that are often incompatible with healthy, sustainable and equitable food systems.
The intensification of shareholder primacy in the corporate FFR sector
Our analysis revealed that since the 1980’s, the leading FFRs – McDonald’s, Yum! Brands, and Restaurant Brands International – distributed increasing sums of money to their shareholders relative to their total revenues. We found a peak in McDonald’s shareholder value ratio in 2016 (57.8%), which is likely attributable to the company’s record US$11.2 billion share buyback program it implemented that year [94]. Similarly, Yum! Brands’ ratio increased markedly from 2018, peaking at 68.4%, shortly after a major US$5.4 billion buyback in 2016 and during a period of continued capital returns [95]. Share buyback programs are a financial strategy whereby companies repurchase their own shares from the market, thereby reducing the number of outstanding shares. They are often used to increase earnings per share, signal confidence in future performance, and return surplus capital to shareholders in lieu of dividends [96]. They also function to increase share prices in the short term, thereby enhancing capital gains for shareholders and inflating executive compensation tied to stock performance [97]. In the context of McDonald’s and Yum! Brands, these buybacks coincided with major organisational transformations – including refranchising, cost-cutting, and structural separation (in Yum’s case, the spin-off of Yum China) – suggesting that buybacks may have also been used to manage investor perceptions and reinforce a commitment to shareholder returns during periods of strategic transition.
These escalating shareholder returns – facilitated by mechanisms like buybacks – reflect and reinforce the growing influence of financial actors in the sector. Similar to the agricultural input and meat processing sectors, the global FFR industry is characterised by the considerable involvement of institutional investors and private companies (i.e., companies that are not publicly listed) [98]. The role of such financial actors in shaping the strategic orientation of the global FFR sector warrants greater attention. Similar to other food system sectors, institutional investors – including asset managers and pension funds – are major shareholders in publicly listed FFR firms [35], bolstering the shareholder primacy model in the sector. At the same time, FFRs have become increasingly attractive to private equity, due in part to its franchising model and opportunities for rapid cost-cutting [99]. Private equity’s short-termist logic – often reliant on debt-fuelled acquisitions and aggressive restructuring – may exacerbate financial instability and undermine labour and sustainability outcomes. A leading example is Roark Capital, which has become the dominant private equity firm in the global FFR sector [100], owning 60 different franchise and multi-unit brands that, collectively, generate approximately US$24 billion in revenue across 27,000 locations in 78 countries [101]. The implications of common and private ownership merit further investigation but are beyond the scope of this paper.
Implications for food systems: governance, public health and equity, cultural shifts, and environmental impacts
The emphasis on shareholder primacy in corporate FFRs has significantly accelerated their global expansion, cementing many U.S.-based corporate FFRs as the dominant provisioners of fast-food (Supplementary Figure S1). While corporatisation of food systems has been the norm in advanced capitalist economies like the United States and the United Kingdom for some time [26], our analysis indicates that this trend is rapidly unfolding in LMICs, consistent with the broader nutrition transition phenomenon. Large FFR corporations play a role in displacing traditional diets, meals, food services, and cultures – as well as the capacity for alternative fast-food industries to emerge and flourish [102]. With a focus on convenience and meals centred around intensively produced meatFootnote 9 and ultra-processed foods, FFRs not only reflect, but also enable, capitalist transformations in society, reducing time and energy dedicated to food preparation and consumption [103]. In this sense, corporate fast food can be seen as both a manifestation and a driver of the corporate food regime [30, 104].
The displacement of traditional meals is particularly concerning in countries outside the global North. As urbanisation intensifies, the market for convenience foods grows, and FFRs – predominantly originating from the United States – actively adapt their offerings to align with local cultural preferences, a process known as ‘glocalisation’ [105]. For instance, in South Korea, China, and Saudi Arabia, our findings highlight significant market expansion driven by KFC and McDonald’s, which have incorporated regional dietary preferences such as increased chicken and pork consumption (except in Saudi Arabia, where pork is prohibited) [106]. Franchising facilitates this ‘glocalisation’ by enabling FFRs to acquire localised knowledge about consumer preferences, supply chains, and business practices, enhancing their competitive edge [58].
However, corporate FFRs also displace local convenience food vendors in LMICs, many of which are small- and medium-sized enterprises offering traditional foods that offer more diverse and culturally embedded food options, often distinct from the standardised, ultra-processed and meat-intensive offerings of corporate FFRs [26]. While corporate FFRs are not the only vendors of unhealthy and unsustainable foods, their scale, ownership structures, and growth strategies may afford them a disproportionate capacity to shape global dietary patterns compared to small-scale vendors [107, 108]. When corporate FFRs headquartered in HICs expand into LMICs, this dynamic could be considered a form of neocolonialism, as it often encroaches on local food systems and pushes local alternatives out of the market [109, 110]. Such displacement not only has implications for food cultures, but raises concerns regarding the sustainability and health impacts of shifting from traditional diets to those reliant on ultra-processed foods and industrially produced meat. This is because the expansion of corporatised FFRs, with their reliance on global supply chains, intensifies the demand for intensively produced meat, UPFs, and their associated inputs – such as commodity crops and plastics [111] – contributing to deforestation, biodiversity loss, and increased greenhouse gas emissions. The long-term environmental and public health consequences of allowing corporate FFRs to dominate local markets and displace more sustainable, traditional food systems warrants critical consideration.
Potential policy responses
This study highlights the increasing expansion and financialisation-driven restructuring of the global fast-food industry, suggesting that policy responses are best targeted toward the structural factors that allow these corporations to proliferate in food systems. Much of the policy proposals from the public health sector have focused narrowly on piecemeal and individual-level options, such as providing nutrient information or kilojoule labelling on menus [112]. Some food environment-based policies include zoning policiesFootnote 10 that restrict FFR placement in relation to schools [113]. However, very few policy responses have attempted to tackle the deeper economic and political structures that enable FFRs to expand and exert power. One key policy intervention is to dismantle government subsidies that disproportionately benefit large agri-food corporations (such as agricultural subsidies toward commodity crops like corn and soy), thereby leveling the playing field for small- and medium-sized enterprises, which often provide more diverse and culturally relevant food options [26, 102]. Such an approach may help to regulate, and even actively reshape, the supply chains that feed into these industries, particularly in relation to the sourcing of intensive meat and dairy and ultra-processed foods that the corporate FFR industry relies on. Moreover, leveraging competition policies to address the concentration of corporate power, particularly in LMICs, could play an important role in supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises and addressing market dominance [114, 115]. Strengthening competition law could also help to curb private equity-led consolidation, where firms use ‘roll-up’ strategies to acquire and merge smaller competitors, reducing market competition [116]. Regulatory bodies, such as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission under the Biden administrationFootnote 11, have begun scrutinising these tactics, recognising their role in entrenching corporate dominance across various industries, including fast-food [117]. These tools could represent critical leverage points for healthy and sustainable food system advocates, who may find opportunities to challenge industry power by aligning with broader efforts to curb excessive financial speculation and corporate consolidation.
Environmental and labour regulations, such as due diligence laws that require greater accountability in sourcing and production, could also limit the expansion of corporate food supply chains that sustain this particular fast-food model [118, 119]. The way this might work in practice and its impact on food supply chains warrants further investigation. Moreover, strengthening social and income protections can also reduce the socio-economic barriers that drive dependence on cheap fast food, improving access to sustainable and healthy diets for all [120].
Targeting the franchising model and private equity involvement in FFRs through stronger labour protections and franchisee rights may prevent exploitative practices, especially in LMICs where regulatory frameworks are less developed. Additionally, strengthening regulations on private equity – such as disincentivising leveraged buyouts and closing tax loopholes that benefit these firms – could curb the most extractive financial practices in the sector. Regulating private equity’s role in the sector could further safeguard local economies and workers from the negative impacts of financialisation, contributing to a more resilient and equitable food system [121]. From a food sovereignty perspective, these protections could help safeguard the flourishing of local food economies, reduce dependency on transnational corporate actors, and support more democratically governed food systems.
Strengths and limitations
This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the global FFR industry, leveraging large datasets to identify key market trends, corporate strategies, and financial dynamics. A major strength of this work is its focus on transnational corporations, allowing for a detailed examination of how leading FFR firms operate across diverse markets. The study also contributes to the broader political economy of food literature on corporate food systems by documenting the increasing penetration of FFRs in LMICs and the financial practices reshaping the sector. Additionally, by using standardised financial and sales data, this analysis offers a robust, comparative perspective on FFR market expansion and corporate profitability across different regions.
However, several limitations should be acknowledged. First, as with any secondary data analysis, findings are constrained by the availability and quality of existing data sources. While our dataset includes 54 countries, which is a substantial proportion, it nonetheless represents only 27% of the world’s nations, limiting its global coverage. Furthermore, although we analyse long-term trends, we do not explicitly account for the broader economic, political, or public health contexts—such as financial crises, trade policies, or the COVID-19 pandemic—that may have influenced these trends.
A key limitation is the lack of granular data on FFR sales by meal or product categories. This restricts our ability to directly quantify changes in the sales of UPFs and meat, despite evidence that these products form a substantial part of corporate fast-food offerings [22].
Another methodological constraint is the discrepancy between our two main data sources. Euromonitor data covers 2009–2023, while Compustat data extends from 1980 to 2023, creating differences in the temporal scope of our analysis. While both datasets provide valuable insights, this discordance means that financial trends observed in Compustat over the long term could not be directly compared with market sales trends captured by Euromonitor in more recent years. It was also beyond the scope of the analysis to verify data extracted from Compustat, which may contain instances of missing, duplicated, or inconsistent figures, particularly for firms listed outside North America. Moreover, currency exchange rate fluctuations may have influenced some observed trends.
Future research could provide a more nuanced analysis of the financial strategies employed by the corporatised FFR sector, with a particular focus on the leading firms. Additionally, examining how FFRs intersect with other key actors in the food supply chain, such as meat processors and ultra-processed food manufacturers, as well as other financial actors, such as asset managers, could illuminate the broader corporate dynamics shaping corporate-industrial food systems. Finally, understanding how these financial and operational strategies impact the intersecting outcomes of public health, equity, and environmental sustainability, could inform future holistic policy interventions.