Four years after the military coup of February 2021, Myanmar was hit by a massive earthquake on 28 March 2025. While the earthquake may have been an unavoidable natural disaster, the response by the Myanmar military, the SAC, has politicised response efforts.
As in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, which killed around 140,000 people in Myanmar in 2008 and affected over two million others in their livelihoods, the military has denied access to humanitarian actors at key moments, weaponised relief efforts for its own political means, and continued planning its elections announced for later this year, which will inevitably be flawed and illegitimate. As the country experiences its darkest hours, international donors have withdrawn vital support in key areas such as health care, education and humanitarian assistance to refugees. What can past experiences of post-disaster relief efforts teach us about the role of local and global responses in Myanmar?
The politicisation of aid
Just like the earthquake of March 2025, Cyclone Nargis followed soon after a large public uprising. The monk-led anti-military protests in September 2007 – somewhat inadequately named the ‘Saffron Revolution’ (Myanmar monks wear maroon) – erupted after a sudden rise in fuel and transportation prices, and were met with severe military violence. As the protests surged to as many as 100,000 monks and lay people by September 2007, the military opened fire on demonstrators, resulting in tens to hundreds of casualties and over 5,000 detentions. This was the first demonstration and crackdown in Myanmar to receive large-scale international attention, due to the increased presence of international journalists, the compelling images of the monk-led demonstrations and the violence against protestors and bystanders, including the killing of a Japanese journalist, all of which was depicted in the Oscar-nominated documentary Burma VJ. The crackdown of the 2007 uprising resulted in a new wave of political refugees and renewed military repression inside the country.
As part of its self-imposed ‘Roadmap to Democracy’, the military continued to organise a referendum to approve its flawed new constitution. Days after the devastating Cyclone Nargis, the military held a referendum in which 98 per cent of the population reportedly voted, with 92 per cent approving the constitution that granted considerable power to the military in politics and governance. The military still claims to rule by this constitution today, whereas the political opposition formed after the 2021 coup has officially announced its abolishment. The military also sought to justify its coup attempt with reference to the 2008 constitution, an argument which most legal experts consider false.
In an effort to legitimise its rule, the military organised the first elections in decades in November 2010, which it won with its proxy party, USDP. My PhD research, which formed the basis of my 2024 Contested Civil Society in Myanmar (now fully open access), started in the run-up to these 2010 elections, when civil liberties were increasing slowly and partially, spearheaded by a new generation of social and political activists who had emerged in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. The military declined international assistance in the crucial first phase after the cyclone, inspiring young activists from central and southern Myanmar to join or start civil society organisations. Many of my respondents described their personal awakening of a ‘community spirit’ in the aftermath of the cyclone. Through the eventual involvement of international actors, primarily brokered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), they also came to interact more with foreign actors, for some marking the start of an international humanitarian career.
Just like Cyclone Nargis, the earthquake which struck Myanmar on 28 March 2025 has been marked by a toxic combination of inadequate response by the military authorities, continued political repression and the weaponisation of local and international relief efforts. Several parts of central Myanmar that were struck by the earthquake, moreover, had been hotbeds of armed resistance since the 2021 coup, becoming zones of active conflict. While the military initially called for international support, it soon began restricting aid to prioritise its own goals and keep assistance away from opposition-controlled areas. It installed strict procedures on aid delivery to areas under its control, and even shot at a convoy of the Chinese Red Cross that was allegedly travelling without permission. Reconstruction efforts led by Chinese and other Asian aid providers have been directed mostly to the military’s own controlled areas, such as the capital Naypyidaw, established by the previous military government in 2005.
Local resilience, global silence
Amid these structural obstacles, a new generation of local activists, many of whom I’ve been researching since 2024, are leading grassroots relief efforts. Operating in regions like Sagaing Township and Southern Shan State, they organise fundraisers and supply deliveries, often at great personal risk. While continuously seeking to reach local populations in non-SAC controlled areas, they report being targeted, questioned and in some cases detained at military checkpoints.
Running low on voluntary recruits, the military enforced a conscription law in early 2024, compelling young people up to 35 to enrol in the military and fight against their own people. Many youth have already fled the country as a result, and those still in Myanmar who lead resistance and relief efforts continue to face serious risks.
Just like after Cyclone Nargis, the 2025 earthquake could potentially mark the start of a new awakening of civil society actors emerging from the anti-coup resistance. The question is, at what price does Myanmar’s youth pay? Faced with an impossible choice between risking their lives and liberties or leaving behind their country, friends and family to pursue an (often illegal) life abroad, Myanmar’s new generation of civil society activists faces not only unprecedented levels of repression but also increasing neglect by the international community.
A humanitarian crisis in the shadows
Just weeks before the earthquake, USAID announced its stop work order, leaving thousands to millions of activists, refugees and IDPs who were dependent on international relief without their last line of support. International networks such as The Border Consortium providing aid to refugees in Thailand, and various relief agencies assisting Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are facing increasing gaps in their funding, which other donors are struggling to fill; the World Food Programme, for example, announced that assistance to Rohingya refugees would be halved to 6 USD per month per person. Support for populations inside Myanmar remains even more scarce, with most donors pulling out of Myanmar and leaving humanitarian assistance to organisations based on the ground, such as MSF, Skills for Humanity and Sonne International, and many locally led informal initiatives that cannot be named due to safety concerns. A contact I spoke to in Magway two months after the earthquake reported having received no international assistance in his region at all.
Meanwhile, the military has continued airstrikes on the (often earthquake-affected) areas considered hotbeds of resistance, killing more than 300 people and injuring over 500 others, including schoolchildren. Sadly, unlike the earthquake, news of these casualties does not even always reach international media. What the Myanmar population urgently needs is adequate humanitarian aid, moral and political support for its resistance against military repression and international assistance for refugees fleeing repression, armed conflict and forced conscription. What they do not need are empty statements, half-hearted attempts at diplomatic pressure on the military or public withdrawals of support, such as the closure of the Yangon-based embassy recently announced by my home country, the Netherlands. My book testifies to the capacity of the Myanmar population to defy repression and rebuild its country if provided with sufficient support.
Maaike Matelski is Assistant Professor in the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Contested Civil Society in Myanmar by Maaike Matelski is available on Bristol University Press for £27.99 here.
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