What Trump’s Cuba Policy Should Be to Advance US Interests

WML: There are two substantive changes in the new NSPM. First, it directs the State Department to update the so-called “Restricted Entities” list—an official list created by Trump during his first term of Cuban enterprises with which US citizens and companies are banned from doing business. And it expands the criteria of the list to include entities that operate “on behalf of” the Cuban armed forces, not just ones operated by the armed forces. The new list, along with a list of prohibited hotels, was released on July 11, but it simply adds seven new hotels to list—not a drastic change.

The other significant change in the new NSPM prohibits “indirect” as well as “direct” transactions with entities on the “Restricted” list. Presumably, an indirect transaction would be one that goes through some intermediary entity that is not listed.

GT: Adding the words “and indirect” might suggest that the administration could pursue what are called “secondary sanctions”—penalties against entities from other countries (such as Spain or Canada) that do business with Cuba. But the “Restricted Entities List” is a list of Cuban enterprises tied to the military with whom US citizens and companies cannot do business. It doesn’t apply to third-country entities, at least in its present form.

But secondary sanctions, if imposed, could be very damaging to the Cuban economy. They might force current foreign investors and trading partners to withdraw from Cuba, and they would certainly deter new investors, at a time when Cuba urgently needs hard currency and foreign investment. Though they might, ironically, offer new opportunities for Russian and Chinese investment as others withdraw.

TN: The NSPM orders US agencies to update their Cuba regulations within 30 days. We will likely know what those are by the beginning of August. What can we expect in terms of future restrictions on the right to travel for educational tours such as the ones The Nation leads to Cuba?

WML: Surprisingly, the NSPM appears to leave group people-to-people travel intact by spelling out the conditions under which it is licensed. Of course, Trump can always add new sanctions on travel, remittances, etc., as he did during his first term. But the new NSPM is more a reaffirmation of the status quo than it is an escalation of sanctions.

GT: Since the NSPM announcement, the administration has added seven hotels—including the Gran Aston in Havana where some educational tour groups have stayed—to the “prohibited” list. New regulations in the next month certainly could create more obstacles for travel. But, overall, the NSPM seems to preserve nonacademic educational travel, and travel to “support the Cuban people.” So significant new restrictions on travel seem unlikely.

TN: Trump has touted his Cuba policies as “maximum pressure.” But you are co-authors of a new, and extremely timely, policy study—“US-Cuban Relations: A Realist Case for Pragmatic Engagement”—that presents a cogent argument for a very different approach. What are the origins of this study? What is “pragmatic engagement”?

GT: You know, it became clear during the 2024 election season that national security arguments were the only compelling set of arguments that might motivate either a Democratic or a Republican administration to change course on Cuba. So in the summer of 2024 we pulled together a set of experts on Cuba policy with whom we could consult on recommendations for a new policy approach focused on national security. We did one-on-one interviews and drafted this policy paper around national interest arguments.

WML: In assessing foreign policy options, realists look first at the national interest, so we asked ourselves what policy toward Cuba would best advance a range of US interests. We focused on the priorities President Trump has voiced with regard to the Western Hemisphere: managing migration, containing the influence of US global rivals, halting the flow of narcotics, and securing access to strategic minerals.

A pragmatic engagement policy is one that adapts US objectives to our capabilities. In other words, what works? What can be done by the United States unilaterally, at low cost, with little downside risk, to advance our objectives. In the paper we argue that US objectives are more likely to be advanced by engaging with Cuba rather than by maintaining a policy of sanctions and hostility, which hasn’t advanced US interests despite being in place for more than 60 years.

GT: President Trump’s foreign policy has focused on defending US national interests, and US security. In Latin America, in particular, that policy has focused on migration issues, on limiting the influence of China and Russia, and on drug policy. We argue that these US interests would be more effectively advanced by engaging with Cuba than by maintaining or further tightening our embargo.

An example: Cuba’s weakened economy has led to a wave of migration; hardening our border can slow that wave but not stop it. And tightening the screws on the Cuban economy will only contribute to migration pressures. The Trump administration has suspended dialogue with Cuba on migration issues, making migration management even harder. Reengaging with Cuba on migration talks, and steps to ease economic pressures that drive migration (especially steps that might help the Cuban private sector) would serve our national interest more effectively than a policy of maximum pressure would.

TN: Cuba is already in a dire economic situation. What are the humanitarian consequences of further destabilizing Cuba economically?

WML: US sanctions have played a major role in the current humanitarian crisis on the island, along with the Covid pandemic and policy mistakes by the Cuban government. More intense sanctions mean a deeper crisis, increasing pressures for emigration, reducing the Cuban government’s capacity to cooperate on issues of mutual interest like narcotics interdiction, and opening the door to China and Russia as they come to Cuba’s aid. None of these outcomes serve US interests.

GT: Food shortages and malnutrition are already issues in Cuba, and the country is receiving aid from the World Food Program. Energy shortage means frequent blackouts. The healthcare system is struggling to provide basic services. Tightening the US embargo further, through secondary sanctions or other measures, is going to increase hunger and human suffering, decrease hope, and drive further migration.

TN: Given the dire situation on the island, what are the next steps that a prudent and “pragmatic” US policy should take?

GT: First, we can help the Cuban economy and the private sector there by taking Cuba off the list of “State Sponsors of Terror.” This inaccurate designation deters foreign businesses, banks, and governments from interacting with Cuba, and makes it much harder for the private sector to carry out international financial transactions. We should permit what’s called “correspondent banking,” so that private businesses in Cuba have the ability to open US bank accounts and operate in regular banking channels. We should let US investors, and that means mostly Cuban Americans, invest in private and cooperative businesses in Cuba. All of those are easy measures that would help the Cuban economy and the private sector and ease the pressures that drive migration. Obviously, we should make it easier for humanitarian aid groups to send food, medicine, and other supplies without the restrictions and red tape that currently exist.

These are all first steps. We need to be realistic and recognize that they won’t transform Cuba, or US-Cuban relations overnight. But they would set us on a path that serves US national and security interests.

WML: We should engage! That is the basic lesson of the Obama–Raul Castro breakthrough to normalize relations in December 2014 which successfully advanced US interests before Trump reverted to a policy of perpetual hostility.

Engagement is possible and productive. During the two years that Obama’s policy was in place, the United States and Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations and signed 22 bilateral cooperation agreements on issues of mutual interest. Educational and cultural exchanges and travel flourished, enriching both countries. New economic links were established. Cuban and Cuban American families were reunited. And the two governments for the first time opened diplomatic discussions about tough issues like human rights and property claims.

Engagement is popular. United States allies around the world cheered Obama’s policy, especially in Latin America. Opinion in the United States was overwhelmingly positive, even among Republicans. By the end of the Obama administration, even the majority of Cuban Americans in Miami favored lifting the embargo.

Engagement is unavoidable. Cuba is only 90 miles away and it’s not going anywhere. Over the years, even Republican presidents have learned that there are some problems Washington cannot solve unilaterally. That realization led almost all of them to engage diplomatically with Cuba on one issue of another, almost always with positive results. Only Obama had the courage to attempt full normalization, and he made more progress in two years than all his predecessors and successors collectively have made in more than half a century.